Why do faultlines matter? A computational model of how strong demographic faultlines undermine team cohesion by Flache, Andreas et al.
  
 University of Groningen
Why do faultlines matter? A computational model of how strong demographic faultlines
undermine team cohesion
Flache, Andreas; Mas, Michael; Mäs, Michael
Published in:
Simulation Modelling Practice and Theory
DOI:
10.1016/j.simpat.2007.11.020
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2008
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Flache, A., Mas, M., & Mäs, M. (2008). Why do faultlines matter? A computational model of how strong
demographic faultlines undermine team cohesion. Simulation Modelling Practice and Theory, 16(2), 175 -
191. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.simpat.2007.11.020
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
Available online at www.sciencedirect.comSimulation Modelling Practice and Theory 16 (2008) 175–191
www.elsevier.com/locate/simpatWhy do faultlines matter? A computational model of how
strong demographic faultlines undermine team cohesion
Andreas Flache *, Michael Ma¨s
Department of Sociology/ICS, University of Groningen, The Netherlands
Available online 1 February 2008Abstract
Lau and Murnighan (LM) suggested that strong demographic faultlines threaten team cohesion and reduce consensus.
However, it remains unclear which assumptions are exactly needed to derive faultline eﬀects. We propose a formal com-
putational model of the eﬀects of faultlines that uses four elementary social mechanisms, social inﬂuence, rejection, hom-
ophily and heterophobia. We show that our model is consistent with the central hypotheses of LM’s theory. We also ﬁnd
that negative eﬀects of faultlines can be derived even when – unlike LM – we assume that initially there is no correlation
between the demographic characteristics and the opinions of team members.
 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Immigration and the internationalization of organizations are trends that make work teams in modern
work organizations increasingly diverse in terms of their demographic composition. This led management
scholars to study intensively the consequences of diversity on team performance. However, diversity research
has not produced a clear cut picture. While some authors reported positive eﬀects, others found that more
demographic diversity may reduce team performance (for comprehensive reviews about theoretical and empir-
ical research see: [3,29,31,44,47,49]). In search for explanatory mechanisms, researchers have identiﬁed two
main arguments [38]. Diversity can be beneﬁcial for organisations because diverse teams have a larger pool
of social and human capital that can be used to increase the teams’ performance (e.g. [7]). But at the same time,
diverse teams tend to be less cohesive than homogenous teams and cohesion is a main determinant of perfor-
mance (e.g. [18,19]). The less cohesive a team is the less will it be able to make use of its social and human
capital. Milliken and Martins concluded that ‘‘diversity thus appears to be a double-edged sword” [29, 403].
Milliken and Martins’ conclusion inspired researchers to search for conditions that mediate the link
between diversity and cohesion. Lau and Murnighan [23,24] in particular added a new idea to the debate. They1569-190X/$ - see front matter  2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.simpat.2007.11.020
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be the way diverse demographic attributes are distributed in a team. More in particular, in their view cohesion
suﬀers in a diverse group only to the extent that the distribution of attributes across group members generates
a strong demographic faultline. A demographic faultline exists if not all members of the team are similar with
respect to a salient demographic attribute, but only strong faultlines cause problems. Here and in the remain-
der of this paper, we consider those individual attributes as ‘demographic’ which are either ﬁxed or change
only so slowly (such as educational level) that they can be considered as constant in the time frame in which
opinion formation in groups takes place. Group faultlines increase in strength as more attributes are highly
correlated, reducing the number and increasing the homogeneity of resulting subgroups. In contrast, faultlines
are weakest when attributes are not aligned and multiple subgroups can form [23, 328]. To give an example, a
faultline is strong in a team consisting of two Caucasian, highly educated women and two African–American
men with low level of education. In this case, all three demographic dimensions along which team members
diﬀer (race, sex, educational level) split the team along the same line. The faultline would be weaker if, for
example, the two highly educated team members would be one man and one woman, and of the two African
Americans, one would have a low education and one a high education.
The core prediction of the faultline argument (see [23, p. 331]) is that the negative eﬀects of diversity on
performance that research often ﬁnds are spurious correlations. Lau and Murnighan propose that not diver-
sity but the strength of the demographic faultline increases dissensus between team members and thus puts
performance under pressure. Controlling for faultline strength, the theory implies, direct eﬀects of diversity
on performance are always positive because diverse teams have a larger pool of human and social capital that
results in higher performance. Faultline strength on the other hand aﬀects performance only negatively.
How do Lau and Murnighan derive this prediction? Their reasoning [23, pp. 332–333] is based on two main
mechanisms: First they propose that team members prefer to interact with those who are similar with respect
to a salient demographic attribute. This corresponds to the widely accepted idea that homophily [25] is a strong
force in social interactions [28]. Which demographic attribute is salient in a certain work situation changes
from situation to situation. Secondly, if actors choose to interact they are assumed to exert social inﬂuence
[10] upon each other. Based on psychological research on opinion formation in groups [16,46] Lau and Murni-
ghan propose that social inﬂuence occurs in the course of social interactions where team members exchange
the arguments their opinions are based on. The authors assume furthermore that demographically similar
actors tend to hold similar opinions. The interplay of these mechanisms implies opinion splits in teams with
strong faultlines. To explain, if team members hold the same value on a salient demographic attribute then
homophily implies that they will more often interact and exchange the arguments their opinions are based
on. In the process, all demographically similar interaction partners will become more convinced of their
respective opinion, because they tend to agree in opinion and they learn new arguments that are in line with
their opinion. In other words their opinions become more extreme.1 Because in teams with a strong faultline
the same team members interact again and again the opinions of the demographic subgroups become more
and more distinct which leads to conﬂicts between the groups at the expense of lower cohesion of the team
as a whole.
While Lau and Murnighan’s reasoning is compelling, it remains unclear what exactly the theoretical
assumptions are that are needed to derive the prediction that the strength of faultlines has negative eﬀects
on cohesion and performance. In other words, the transparency of Lau and Murnighan’s theory would beneﬁt
from a formal deduction of their central claims. Moreover, such a formal deduction would facilitate the gen-
eration of new hypotheses about conditions under which faultline eﬀects can be expected to occur and possible1 Lau and Murnighan need for this reasoning the assumption that demographically similar agents have similar opinions already prior to
interaction. However, the authors make this assumption not explicit. To explain emergent subgroup splits, Lau and Murnighan refer to
insights from psychological studies [16,46] which show that if interacting actors hold similar opinions, then their opinions become more
extreme because they learn from each other new arguments to support their opinions. But this reasoning only implies a subgroup split if
the interacting agents already hold similar opinions when they meet. If their prior opinions were dissimilar, then arguments for conﬂicting
opinions would be exchanged through interaction, which in turn would decrease actors’ conﬁdence in their opinions and thus weaken
rather than strengthen subgroup splits. We propose in this paper an explanation of faultline eﬀects that does not require the assumption of
previous opinion similarity between demographically similar agents.
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the objective of the present paper is to fully explicate and formalize the dynamics that may underlie the eﬀects
of demographic faultlines on cohesion in demographically diverse groups. For this, we use a formal compu-
tational model and show that it explains the eﬀects of faultline strength on cohesion that Lau and Murnighan
proposed.
In Section 2, we describe the underlying formal model. Section 3 contains a description of the computa-
tional experiments and results. In Section 4, we discuss results, oﬀer conclusions and point to possible future
research that could apply our model to generate insights of practical relevance for organizations.
2. The model
In this section we develop the formal model. The model consists of three main elements. The ﬁrst element is
the formalization of the dynamics and elementary mechanisms of social interactions and inﬂuence between
team members. The second element consists of our operationalization of the concept of demographic faultlines.
Thirdly, we devise aggregate outcome measures that capture the dependent variables we are interested in.
2.1. The social interaction and inﬂuence dynamics
We assume that consensus on work related opinions is a major factor for the performance of teams.
Accordingly, the main endogenous variable of our model is the distribution of work related opinions in the
team. Work related opinions may be attitudes about what the team’s task is and how to fulﬁl the task. The
distribution of these attitudes can be characterized by the degree to which it resembles one of two theoretical
extremes: consensus and polarization. If all team members hold exactly the same opinions then there is perfect
consensus. If the distribution is bipolar and all team members hold opinions that are maximally diﬀerent from
those on the opposite pole, then this outcome is perfect polarization. Obviously, polarization is a major
obstacle to good team performance, while consensus at least on fundamental issues seems to be a necessary
precondition for eﬀective teamwork.
We focus on the distribution of work related opinions as a main outcome variable for two reasons. First,
the team is able to complete its task only if the team members agree to a certain extent on what the task of the
team is and how to cope with it [30,32, pp. 175–176]. Second, the theoretical assumptions of homophily and
social inﬂuence identify a clear causal link between team cohesion, consensus on work related opinions and the
strength of demographic faultlines in a team. Broadly, the stronger are faultlines in the team, the less likely it is
that team members in diﬀerent subgroups inﬂuence each other suﬃciently to generate a consensus on work
related opinions on the level of the team as a whole, and the more likely it is that the inﬂuence processes result
in polarization rather than consensus. At the same time, the combined assumptions of homophily and inﬂu-
ence link the degree of consensus closely to the level of cohesion in the team. We assume that only when team
members agree on important issues will they have good social relations with each other which, in turn, gen-
erates social cohesion.
With this approach, we deliberately exclude from our analysis variables which also may aﬀect performance
but which are not or at least much less directly causally related to faultline strength [23], like the size of the
team’s pool of human and social capital.
What are the model’s main ingredients? Our model starts from the assumption that the eﬀects of faultlines
on opinion polarization (and poor team performance) are generated by the interplay of the four fundamental
social mechanisms homophily, social inﬂuence, heterophobia and rejection. According to homophily, the more
similar two actors are with respect to salient opinions or demographic characteristics, the more they like each
other and the more they interact [4,5,15,20,25,28,39]. According to social inﬂuence, if two persons interact
they adapt their opinions [1,4,21]. Both homophily and social inﬂuence are widely documented and robust
mechanisms of social interaction and are also used by Lau and Murnighan. In combination, these two mech-
anisms have a paradoxical implication. The interplay of homophily and social inﬂuence implies an inexorable
tendency towards consensus. The key reason is a feed back loop. Minimal initial similarity leads actors to inter-
act which leads to an increase of similarity which then increases the probability of further interaction. In the-
ory, this process continues until all agents mutually interact and are absolutely similar. However, Axelrod’s
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bal diﬀerentiation. The key assumption that generated this result was cultural speciation. Axelrod assumed
social interaction between neighbors to be entirely cut oﬀ when actors disagree beyond a certain critical level.
As a consequence, homophily and social inﬂuence stabilize diﬀerences between subgroups [2,11,12,14,48].
We believe there are at least two problems with Axelrod’s explanation of diversity when it comes to the
analysis of opinion polarization in work groups. First, in work groups, there is little room to entirely avoid
social interaction with dissimilar others. Both physical exposure and task interdependencies force group mem-
bers to communicate and take notice of each others’ opinions. But even if group members could entirely
ignore inﬂuence from dissimilar others, Axelrod’s model can at best explain why diﬀerences between sub-
groups persist over time. However, it can not readily explain why empirical studies found in groups with
strong faultlines a tendency towards extreme and over time increasing opinion diﬀerences between a small
number of opposed and demographically dissimilar factions in the team (cf. [9]).
To address this pattern, we followed previous research and complemented the mechanisms of homophily
and social inﬂuence with their negative counterparts of heterophobia and rejection2 [17,22,26,34–37,42]. Hete-
rophobia assumes that if the dissimilarity of two actors exceeds a certain threshold then the actors do not like
each other [6,8,33,40,41,43]. Rejection states that actors have a tendency to change their attributes in a way to
become more dissimilar to interaction partners they do not like [1,22,42,45].
Finally, our model distinguishes between two types of attributes on which agents can diﬀer and which
deﬁne the level of similarity between agents. Demographic attributes on the one hand are ﬁxed and can not
be changed by the dynamics of social inﬂuence and rejection. On the other hand, opinions are ﬂexible and
are subject to social inﬂuence and rejection. Previous computational studies based on similar sets of assump-
tions have already demonstrated how demographic diﬀerences can lead to the emergence of cultural niches in
demographic space such that demographically dissimilar actors also hold dissimilar or even radically opposing
opinions [26,27]. However, these studies did not address the eﬀects of faultline strength in the demographic
distribution.
Technically, each of the N team members is represented as an agent i characterized by D ﬁxed (afixid Þ and K
ﬂexible attributes (aflexik Þ, where d and k refer to the d’th and k’th ﬁxed and ﬂexible attribute, respectively. The
ﬁxed attributes correspond to the demographic characteristics; the ﬂexible ones represent the agent’s work
related opinions. For simplicity, we assume that demographic attributes and opinions are equally salient.
Moreover, we focus on clearly distinguishable demographic attributes, expressed by the assumption that
demographic attributes are dichotomous and can take either the value 1 or +1 (afixid 2 f1; 1gÞ. Opinions
of the team members can instead vary continuously between 1 and +1 (1 6 aflexik 6 þ1Þ.
A key assumption of the model is that the direction and strength of inﬂuence that an agent i imposes on an
agent j does not depend directly on the opinion of j, but it is moderated by the sign and the strength of the
interpersonal relation between i and j. To model the interpersonal relations between the team members we
assume a directed graph where wij represents the weight of the corresponding relationship (1 6 wij 6 + 1).
If team member i has contact to team member j then the weight wij takes a value between 1 and 1. A positive
weight reﬂects that i evaluates j positively, whereas a negative one represents a hostile relationship. If there is
no contact between i and j, or i is indiﬀerent between liking and disliking j, then the weight is 0.
Both the K ﬂexible attributes and the weights of the relationships are endogenous and change in discreet
time steps. In every time step, one team member is selected randomly with equal probability to update either
his ﬂexible attributes or weights. Then, either all weights of i are updated simultaneously, or all ﬂexible attri-
butes are updated simultaneously, where each option is selected with probability 0.5.
Time is modeled in discreet steps. The duration of a simulation run is expressed in number of iterations.
One iteration corresponds to N simulation steps to assure that on average each agent updates either his
weights or his attributes once within an iteration.
Similar to previous models of social inﬂuence with continuous opinions [1,14], we assume that the change of
team member i’s ﬂexible attribute k is an aggregated result of the inﬂuences imposed by all other agents who2 In Lau and Murnighan’s reasoning, increasing opinion diﬀerences become possible because the authors assume an initial correlation
between demographic attributes and opinions (see also Footnote 1). We discuss in Section 4 why we avoided this assumption.
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value of the attribute, aflexik;tþ1 is obtained by adding to the old value a weighted sum of the pressures of all inﬂu-
ential others. To model a somewhat gradual change of opinions, we also divide this weighted sum by 2. The
pressure imposed by a single alter j ‘‘pulls” i towards j’s opinion if the weight wij is positive, and ‘‘pushes” i
away from j’s opinion if the weight is negative. The magnitude of this pressure is proportional to the distance
in opinions between i and j, aflexik  aflexjk . With only positive weights summing to one, this assumption would
imply that the net pressure imposed on i moves the agent towards the weighted average of the opinions of
all interactions partners. Eq. (1) formalizes these assumptions





wijðaflexjk;t  aflexik;t Þ ð1Þ
To be precise, Eq. (1) only shows the principle model of inﬂuence. In the actual implementation, we apply a
slight modiﬁcation of the inﬂuence equation both to make sure that opinions do not go out of bounds and to
smoothen the change of opinions when agents move towards the extreme ends of the opinion scale. Eqs. (1)a






wijðaflexjk;t  aflexik;t Þ ð1aÞ
aflexik;tþ1 ¼
aflexik;t þ Daflexik;t ð1 aflexik;t Þ; if Daflexik;t > 0
aflexik;t þ Daflexik;t ð1þ aflexik;t Þ; if Daflexik;t 6 0
(
ð1bÞ
Eq. (1a) speciﬁes the resulting change of the focal agent’s opinion, given as a weighted sum of the inﬂuences
imposed by other group members, where the magnitude and direction of the inﬂuence depend on the opinion
distance aflexjk;t  aflexik;t weighted by the strength and valence of the relationship, wij. Eq. (1b) expresses that the
resulting opinion is the sum of the previous opinion and the opinion change times a dampening term that re-
duces the magnitude of the change to the extent that the opinion moves towards a boundary of the opinion
interval. The second key element of our model is the update of weights. Following previous work [26] we as-
sume that the weight that agent i has towards an agent j, changes depending on the similarity between i and j in
terms of both their demographic attributes and their opinions. More precisely, we assume that after updating,
the weight adopts a level that is proportional to the current level of similarity. The new weight is negative if the
average distance between i and j across all dimensions of demographic and opinion space exceeds one, i.e. half
of the maximum average distance. If this average distance is exactly one, the weight is zero and otherwise it






 þPKk¼1 aflexik;t  aflexjk;t 
Dþ K ð2Þ2.2. Faultline strength
To disentangle the eﬀects of the strength of demographic faultlines from eﬀects of demographic diversity,
we devised a method that allows varying faultline strength and keep diversity constant at the same time. More
precisely, we generated diﬀerent distributions of the ﬁxed attributes in such a way that all ﬁxed attributes were
equally frequent (all distributions generate equally diverse groups) but the correlation between the attributes
diﬀered between distributions (the strength of the faultline diﬀers).
Table 1 shows our construction method for the prototypical case of a group with 20 members (N = 20) who
diﬀer along three demographic dimensions (e.g. male/female, young/old, western/non-western ethnical back-
ground). Column 2 of the table shows that we constructed the ﬁrst demographic variable (A1) by alternately
assigning the values 1 and 1 to the ﬁrst N/2 agents beginning with the value 1 for agent 1. We did the same
with the second N/2 agents but here we started with the value 1. The distribution of this variable is the same
in all work teams.
Table 1
Implementation of faultline strength






























1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 
7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1
8 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 
9 1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1
10 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 
11 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1
12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 1
13 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 -1
14 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 1
15 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 -1
16 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1
17 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 1 1 
18 1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1
19 -1 1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 1 1 
20 1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1
Σ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Correlations (r)  
A2 A3 A2 A3 A2 A3 A2 A3 A2 A3
A1 .8 .8 A1 .6 .6 A1 .4 .4 A1 .2 .2 A1 .0 .0
A2 .8 A2 .6 A2 .4 A2 .2 A2 .0
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sponds to a situation where the demographic attributes are completely uncorrelated and f = 1 imposes a per-
fect correlation between all demographic attributes. The ﬁrst step in the construction is to impose the
correlation between attribute A1 and A2 that corresponds to the given parameter value of f. To arrive at
the values for attribute A2, we assigned to the ﬁrst (100  f) % of the cases the same value as for attribute
A1. This means for example for f = 0.9, that the ﬁrst 90% of the agents (the ﬁrst 18 agents if N = 20) hold
the same value at attribute A1 and A2 (see the grey cells in column 3 of Table 1). To the rest of the agents
we assigned on attribute A2 the opposite value of what we assigned for attribute A1.
To determine the values for attribute A3 we used the same method with a small change. We ﬁrst assigned to
the ﬁrst (50  f) % of the cases the same value as for attribute A1. Then we continued with the (N/2+1)th case
and again assigned to the following (50  f) % of the cases the same value as for attribute A1. Again the rest of
the cases got the opposite value than for attribute A1. Thus for f = 0.9 and N = 20 the agents 1–9 and 11–19
hold the same value at attribute A1 and A3 (see column 4 of Table 1). This procedure makes sure, that the
agents also hold at the attributes A2 and A3 in exactly (100  f) % of all cases the same value.
Table 1 also reports the correlations between the three attributes. Note that for a given distribution all pair-
wise correlations between two of the three attributes are equal. The relationship between f and the correlation
is: r = 1 + 2f. If f takes the value 1 then the three attributes are perfectly correlated (r = 1) and the faultline
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the faultline has a minimal strength. At all levels of f, all variables are equally distributed in all teams. We do
not consider in the remainder values of f below 0.5 (corresponding to negative correlations), because for the
strength of a demographic faultline it is only relevant that ﬁxed attributes are correlated, not which direction
the correlation takes.
The key advantage of our method is that it separates variation in faultline strength from variation in diver-
sity. A more intuitive alternative approach could have been to assign attributes randomly with a given prob-
ability and a given correlation. However, for the relatively small groups we are interested in, that method
would have produced considerable random variation in faultline strength between single realizations of distri-
butions imposed by the same level of f. Our deterministic approach excludes this source of random noise and
thus allows us to focus in our computational experiments exclusively on eﬀects of variation in f.
2.3. Aggregate outcome measures
The main claims of the theory of faultlines address two relationships: First the relationship between fault-
line strength and the level of consensus in the team, and second the relationship between faultline strength and
the degree to which divisions in opinions are associated with demographical divisions in the team. To assess
whether our model can reproduce these relationships, we devise four diﬀerent outcome measures. The measure
opinion diversity captures the number of diﬀerent positions in the ﬂexible attributes (opinions) represented in
the team. Opinion variance indicates the average distance between the opinions of diﬀerent agents. Polarization
measures the degree to which the team falls apart into a small number of opposed factions who hold maxi-
mally diﬀerent opinions on all dimensions of the opinion space. Finally, we measure the degree to which dif-
ferences in ﬁxed (demographic) and ﬂexible (opinion) attributes of agents are associated with each other with
the outcome measure attribute-opinion covariance, cov(ﬁx; ﬂex).
Opinion diversity is based on a count of the number of diﬀerent opinion vectors present in the group as a
whole, where only ﬂexible attributes are taken into account. For normalization, we divide this number by the
group size N. Moreover, to express that perfect unity corresponds to no diversity whatsoever, we set opinion
diversity = 0 if there is perfect consensus.3 Hence, 0 6 opinion diversity 6 1. We consider the opinion vectors of
two agents as diﬀerent from each other if their ﬂexible attributes aflexik diﬀer in at least one dimension k by a
magnitude of 0.001 or more. Clearly, both a group with high consensus and a group with perfect polarization
will exhibit low opinion diversity. Perfect consensus implies that all agents share the same vector of opinions
(opinion diversity = zero), whereas perfect polarization implies that there are exactly two maximally diﬀerent
factions in the opinion space (opinion diversity = 2/N).
Opinion variance captures a diﬀerent aspect of consensus than opinion diversity. Opinion diversity can be
high if each agent holds an opinion vector that diﬀers only slightly from that of every other agent, and it
can be low if the number of diﬀerent vectors is small, but the distance between opinions is large, as in the case
of perfect polarization. To also represent the magnitude of opinion distances in an outcome measure, we com-
pute opinion variance as the average standard deviation of opinions across all K dimensions of the opinion
space. In the case of perfect consensus, we obtain opinion variance = 0, and in the case of perfect polarization
with two equally large maximally opposed subgroups we measure opinion variance = 1, the highest value we
ever obtained.4 However, a high level of opinion variance does not necessarily indicate that the group polarizes
in the opinion space. High opinion variance may occur if agents strongly diﬀer from each other in all dimen-
sions of the opinion space, but these diﬀerences are not correlated across dimensions. In that case, the group is
not polarized because it is impossible to separate the group into a small number of subsets such that agents3 This implies that diversity values do not vary in a continuous interval, but there is a gap between 0 and 2/N. However, this
discontinuity is hardly discernible in the results presented below and it does not aﬀect the qualitative interpretation of the measure. We are
grateful to J. Richard Harrison for proposing as a better solution diversity = (number of vectors  1)/(N  1), which we will use in future
studies.
4 In this case, the average opinion in all dimensions is zero. Moreover, in all dimensions half of the group adopts an extreme opinion at
+1 and the other half of the group does so at 1. Hence, on average the distance from the mean amounts to +1 in all dimensions, yielding
the result of variance = +1.
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dimensions with those outside of their subset.
Our measure of polarization captures the degree to which the group can be separated into a small set of
factions who are mutually antagonistic in the opinion space and have maximal internal agreement. To com-
pute polarization, we use the variance of pairwise agreement across all pairs of agents in the population, where
agreement is ranging between 1 (total disagreement) and +1 (full agreement), measured as one minus the
average distance of opinions (averaged across all K subdimensions). This measure obviously adopts its lowest
level of zero for the case of perfect consensus. The maximum level of polarization (polarization = 1) is
obtained when the population is equally divided between the opposite ends of the opinion scale at 1 and
+1 and all opinion dimensions are perfectly correlated.5 With uniformly distributed opinions, the polarization
measure yields approximately 0.22 for K = 1.
Opinion diversity, opinion variance and polarization allow us to characterize the degree to which there is
polarization or consensus in the opinion distribution of a team. But these measures give no insight into the
relationship between demographic diﬀerences and diﬀerences in opinions. To test this relationship, we com-
pute the attribute-opinion covariance, cov(ﬁx; ﬂex). Technically, this index is computed as the covariance
between the vector of pairwise demographic dissimilarities and the pairwise opinion dissimilarities, where
we computed for every pair of actors i and j the dissimilarity measures Dfixi;j and D
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NðN  1Þ ð5Þ3. Results of the computational experiments
The objective of the computer experiments is to test whether the dynamics of our model are consistent with
Lau and Murnighan’s [23] informal reasoning. More precisely, we devise a ﬁxed work team scenario and con-
duct ceteris paribus replications of the group dynamics that our model generates for diﬀerent levels of faultline
strength under the given scenario. The stylized regularity our model should produce in this set of experiments
is a clear-cut negative relationship between the average level of consensus in the opinion distribution and the
strength of demographic faultlines, f. More in particular, we wish to test whether the model generates both less
often consensus and more often polarization as f increases. A second regularity that follows from the theory of
faultline eﬀects and that we want to test is an increasing association of opinion divisions with demographic
divisions as faultlines become stronger. In other words, the stronger the demographic faultlines, the clearer
we expect subgroup splits in the opinion distribution to reﬂect the distribution of demographic attributes.
In the experiments we use the following parameter settings. With regard to group size, we assume N = 20, a
size that is not too big to be unrealistic for a work team, but also large enough to allow for a suﬃciently ﬁne-
grained variation in the strength of demographic faultlines (cf. Table 1). Furthermore, we assume that there
are three salient demographic (ﬁxed) attributes (D = 3). As Table 1 shows, the combination of 20 agents and 3
ﬁxed attributes allows suﬃcient variation in the correlations between the ﬁxed attributes of team members.
Values for the demographic attributes are assigned to agents as shown in Table 1, imposed by the data set5 To see this: In 50% of all dyads the agreement is 1 (indicating maximal agreement), in 50% it is 1 (indicating maximal disagreement).
The average level of agreement is zero and the average distance between the agreement in a particular dyad and the average level of
agreement, i.e. the variance, yields polarization = 1.
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ions), we choose K = 4. This is the smallest number that makes for D = 3 polarization under strong faultlines
not trivial, because with K = 4 and D = 3 (or, more generally, K > D) it is still possible that two agents who
maximally diﬀer in all three demographic dimensions can have a positive relationship if they have suﬃciently
similar opinions. At the same time, this setting makes it hard to avoid polarization in a group with maximal
faultline strength. Furthermore we assumed that initially (at the outset of t = 1) all opinions of all agents are
randomly drawn from a uniform distribution with full coverage of the entire opinion interval and with statis-
tically independent dimensions of the opinion space. As a consequence, initial opinions are also statistically
independent from demographic attributes, which implies that the expected initial attribute-opinion covariance
is zero. After initial opinions have been assigned, initial weights are computed on basis of overall similarity
(see Eq. (2)).
To illustrate how variation in faultline strength aﬀects the model dynamics, we show ﬁrst two typical sim-
ulation runs obtained for a setting with low faultline strength (r = 0.2) and high faultline strength (r = 0.8),
respectively. Fig. 1 charts for both settings the dynamics of the four outcome measures for the ﬁrst 120
iterations.
Fig. 1 shows dramatically diﬀerent outcomes for the two diﬀerent levels of faultline strength. In the weak
faultline case, the simulated group quickly moves towards perfect consensus, as indicated by the rapid decline
of opinion diversity and opinion variance, as well as polarization, from the levels given by the initial random
distribution down to the theoretical minimum level of zero for all three outcome measures. The graph also
shows that from the outset there is no (actually even a slightly negative) association between diﬀerences in
opinions and demographic diﬀerences (see cov(ﬁx; ﬂex)). In the strong faultline case, it takes about 60 itera-
tions until the group has moved from the random initial opinion distribution towards perfect polarization into
two maximally opposed factions. Moreover, opinion divisions and demographic divisions align almost per-
fectly in this case, as indicated by a level of cov(ﬁx; ﬂex) = 0.8 obtained after about 60 iterations.
The explanation for the diﬀerences shown by Fig. 1 can be readily derived from our model assumptions. In
the weak faultline scenario, demographic attributes are almost perfectly uncorrelated with each other. Hence,
there are only very few pairs of agents who maximally diﬀer on all three demographic dimensions. This makes
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Fig. 1. Change in outcome measure for typical simulation runs with weak faultline (left) and strong faultline (right). N = 20,D = 3, K = 4.
184 A. Flache, M. Ma¨s / Simulation Modelling Practice and Theory 16 (2008) 175–191then they will most likely be between agents who are, in turn, embedded into a large number of positive ties
with the same colleagues. As a consequence, positive social inﬂuence prevails and rejection hardly ever occurs
in the social interactions between agents. If some agents are ‘‘pushed” to reject some enemies’ opinions, then
they are at the same time ‘‘pulled in” by many more friends so that the net change of their opinion is more
likely towards the group average than towards the extreme ends of the opinion scale. A similar reasoning
explains why the outcome for the strong faultline case is so diﬀerent. In the strong faultline case, demographic
diﬀerences are maximal within a large fraction of the dyads in the team. In these dyads only relatively small
opinion diﬀerences in the initial conﬁguration suﬃce to generate a negative relationship between the interac-
tants. Moreover, these negative relationships tend to segregate the two major subgroups in demographic space
so that most agents have the same enemies than their friends have. This entails a quick self reinforcing
dynamic towards opinion polarization. Most agents move towards whatever is the current average opinion
proﬁle in their (demographic) in-group and they distance themselves from whatever is the current average
opinion proﬁle in the (demographic) out-group. The result is a coordinated movement of all agents that soon
leads to convergence of their opinions on two opposite poles that align with the demographic faultline in the
group.
To provide a more detailed representation of the micro level dynamics, we modiﬁed the initial conditions
such that simultaneous changes of all opinions of all agents can be graphically illustrated. For clarity of the
illustration, we assume only one ﬁxed attribute (D = 1) along which the group splits into two equally large
subgroups with values 1 and +1 respectively. This corresponds to a situation with more than one demo-
graphic attributes and a maximally strong faultline. To retain the condition that an emergent opinion polar-
ization is not trivial (K > D), we use the smallest number of opinions larger than one that allows an easily
interpretable graphic representation, K = 2. Fig. 2 shows the change of the four outcome measures for a typ-
ical run under this parameter constellation. As Fig. 2 shows, the dynamics are very similar to those we ﬁnd
with more demographic attributes and a strong faultline (right part of Fig. 1). Opinion diversity decreases
and ﬁnally takes the value 0.1, indicating that at the end of the simulation run there are only two diﬀerent
opinion vectors left in the team. All other outcome measures approach relatively fast the maximal value 1.
This shows that members of the two subgroups hold maximally diﬀerent values on the two opinion dimensions
and that the two subgroups also diﬀer in the demographic attribute. The maximal level of cov(ﬁx, ﬂex) in par-
ticular indicates that the demographic attribute and the opinions are perfectly correlated at the end of the
process.
Fig. 3 gives insight into the micro dynamics of the simulation run reported in Fig. 2. It shows scatter plots
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Fig. 2. Change in outcome measure for typical simulation run. N = 20, D = 1, K = 2.
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Fig. 3. Development of the opinion distribution for typical simulation run. N = 20, D = 1, K = 2.
A. Flache, M. Ma¨s / Simulation Modelling Practice and Theory 16 (2008) 175–191 185demographic attribute of the respective team member – thus there are 10 circles and 10 crosses. We labelled
two agents (A and B) with diﬀerent demographic attribute to highlight their opinion changes. The top left scat-
ter plot shows the initial randomly assigned opinion distribution. In the early phase of the team process some
of the agents approach more moderate opinions (see also the slight decline of opinion variance in the ﬁrst iter-
ations reported in Fig. 2). For example agent B, who initially held quite extreme opinions on both dimensions,
holds less extreme opinions in iterations 10 and 20 than in the initial condition. The reason is that in the initial
condition, agent B has some overlap with many of the other team members, most of whom hold opinion posi-
tions relatively close to the center. As a consequence, agent B has positive relations to most of these other
group members. Agent B thus experiences initially positive inﬂuence by others and becomes more similar
to these others. Because B initially holds relatively extreme opinions, he also becomes more moderate in
the process.
However there are also some agents who either keep their extreme positions or develop even more extreme
opinions (see the two circles next to B and the crosses with positive values at opinion one and negative values
at opinion two in the initial opinion distribution). Those agents are negatively inﬂuenced by relatively many
others who are dissimilar with respect to both the demographic attribute and the opinions (heterophobia). As
a consequence, they approach opinions that diﬀer from the opinions of those actors (rejection). That is, their
opinions become more extreme. Subsequently, emergent ‘‘extremists” pull those team members who are rel-
atively similar to them also to the extremes.
From iteration 20 on the developing subgroup split becomes obvious. While the circles tend to hold a neg-
ative value at opinion one and a positive at opinion two, the crosses tend to hold positive values at opinion one
and negative values at opinion two. As a consequence the team members have positive relationships to demo-
graphically similar actors and dislike dissimilar team members. This leads to further increasing opinion diﬀer-
ences. From iteration 50 on all circles hold negative values at opinion one and negative values at opinions two.
The crosses hold opinions with opposing signs. At about iteration 80 equilibrium is reached. The team is now
perfectly polarized.
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agents update their opinions separately per dimension by taking the mean of opinion diﬀerences of all team
members on this dimension (see Eq. (1)). At the same time, the more similar are the opinions of two agents
across all dimensions, the more these agents like each other (see Eq. (2)) and the stronger is their inﬂuence on
each other (see wij Eq. (1)). Hence on both dimensions of the opinion space agents tend to adopt opinions that
align the distance of their opinion to the group proﬁle on the focal dimension with their overall relational
weights vis a vis the other group members. For example, ‘‘circle agents” who are relatively close to the extreme
opinion vector (1, +1) are highly likely to have negative relations to most ‘‘cross agents” and will thus in
both opinion dimensions move away from the average opinion of all ‘‘cross agents” and move towards the
average opinion of their fellow circle agents. Less extreme circle agents will distance themselves only from
a smaller fraction of the population and thus are more likely to hold – at least temporarily – opinions closer
to the centre. As this happens on both opinion dimensions, agents will in both dimension adopt about the
same distance from the average group proﬁle, which results in a gradual move towards the diagonal of the
opinion space. Which of the two diagonals of the two dimensional opinions space the actors coordinate on
depends on how the opinions are distributed initially. In the run shown in Fig. 3 most actors initially hold
opinion combinations in the second and fourth quadrant of the opinions space. Accordingly the actors coor-
dinate on the diagonal that is located in these two quadrants. We also found numerous runs where actors
coordinated on the other diagonal of the opinion space.
We chose the simple case of D = 1 and K = 2 only for sake of illustration. For statistical reliability, we con-
ducted a large number of replications of the ﬁrst computational experiment (with three demographic and four
opinion dimensions, i.e. D = 3, K = 4) and varied faultline strength across the entire interval between r = 0
and r = 1.0 in steps of 0.2. Fig. 4 reports the average of the outcome measures we obtained after iteration
1000, over 500 replications per condition. We do not report opinion diversity in Fig. 4, because for all levels
of faultline strength, ﬁnal states are almost always either perfectly polarized or exhibit perfect consensus so
that the variation of opinion diversity across conditions is extremely small. A detailed representation of the
opinion distributions for all conditions is given in Fig. 5.
Fig. 4 clearly conﬁrms that our model generates the stylized regularities predicted by Lau and Murnighan’s
























Fig. 4. Eﬀect of faultline strength on outcome measures, averages over 500 replications per conditions, outcomes measured after 1000
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Fig. 5. Distribution of polarization measure over 500 replications per condition in experiment 1, broken down by the six diﬀerent levels of
faultline strength. N = 20, D = 3, K = 4.
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when demographic dimensions are entirely unrelated (r = 0) indicate that virtually all simulated groups have
reached almost perfect consensus in this condition. By contrast, with maximal faultline strength (r = 1.0)
groups almost always polarize maximally, as indicated by an average polarization and an average opinion var-
iance at the same level. The correspondingly high value of cov(ﬁx; ﬂex) in this condition shows that it is the
demographic faultline along which the group also splits in the opinion space. The consistent increase of the
outcome in between these two extremes shows that – for the given set of conditions (N = 20, D = 3, K = 4)
– our model clearly implies that higher faultline strength is associated with less consensus, more polarization
and a stronger association between demographic and attitudinal diﬀerences, as predicted by Lau and Murni-
ghan’s theory.
Fig. 4 shows that faultline strength aﬀects the average outcome measures in the expected way, but it gives
no insight into the distribution of qualitatively diﬀerent end states that occur in the population of groups that
were simulated under the same condition. Fig. 5 shows this distribution. The ﬁgure charts for six diﬀerent lev-
els of faultline strength the relative frequencies of the polarization index generated across the 500 groups sim-
ulated under the corresponding condition.
Fig. 5 reveals that model dynamics almost always converge on one of two extreme outcomes, perfect con-
sensus (polarization < 0.02) or perfect polarization (polarization > 0.98). This shows that the gradual shift of
average outcome measures reported in Fig. 4 for increasing faultline strength is mainly generated by a shift
of the distribution between these two extremes. At r = 0, about 98% of all replications generated perfect con-
sensus, while at r = 1.0 perfect polarization was obtained for roughly 89% of the sample. The most balanced
distribution arises at a faultline strength of r = 0.8, where about 37% of the runs yielded consensus and the
remaining 63% produced polarization. The explanation for this result is that perfect consensus and perfect
polarization both constitute robust equilibria of the system. Once perfect consensus is reached, no group mem-
ber is pushed or pulled to change any of her opinions and all weights are at their maximum value of +1. In a
similar vein, once perfect polarization is reached, all ‘‘friends” with equal opinions reinforce an agent to stay
the course, but so do all the enemies with maximally diﬀerent opinions. Both outcomes are equilibria indepen-
dently of the distribution of demographic variables that we simulated, because with some appropriate distri-
bution of the four ﬂexible attributes it is always possible to either impose positive ties between all dyads
(consensus) or split the group into two subgroups where all in-group ties are positive and all out-group ties
are negative. Moreover, these equilibria are not the only possible equilibria. In principle, multiplex equilibria
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tern of relationships and opinions is exactly balanced so that ‘‘push” and ‘‘pull” forces exerted upon agents’
opinion from diﬀerent groups of friends and enemies exactly neutralize each other (cf. [26]).
While perfect consensus, perfect polarization and multiplex opinion distribution can all be equilibrium out-
comes under all simulated conditions, the level of faultline strength strongly aﬀects the likelihood that a par-
ticular one of the possible equilibria is reached by the dynamics of the system. To begin with, the complexity of
the coordination of moves that is needed to obtain a multiplex equilibrium is very high and thus it is under all
conditions quite unlikely that the model generates a multiplex outcome from a random start. This is consistent
with the extremely low frequency of multiplex outcomes in the ﬁnal states of the simulation as reported in
Fig. 5 (see the cases with a ﬁnal polarization value higher than 0.2 and smaller than 0.98) of at most a few
percent of all replications conducted. Beyond this, the stronger the faultline, the ‘‘easier” it is for a group
to coordinate on a sequence of interactions that end up in perfect polarization, because stronger faultlines
come with more negative ties and a higher alignment of negative ties with demographic subgroup boundaries.
Conversely, the weaker the faultline, the more likely it is that there is a suﬃciently large concentration of posi-
tive ties to let all agents move towards a consensus in the opinion space.4. Summary and discussion
We modeled in this paper the eﬀects of demographic faultlines on team performance. Lau and Murnighan’s
theory suggests that the stronger a team’s demographic faultline is, the less cohesive the team will be and the
less likely will the team therefore be able to ﬁnd a consensus with regard to work related opinions. As a con-
sequence, teams with a strong demographic faultline tend to perform poorly. However, Lau and Murnighan’s
reasoning is not suﬃciently explicit to allow a detailed theoretical analysis of the conditions under which these
eﬀects may occur. The aim of our paper was to provide an explication of the theory in terms of a formal com-
putational model. Our model is based on four fundamental social mechanisms, homophily, heterophobia,
social inﬂuence and rejection. We found that the model generates results that are consistent with Lau and
Murnighan’s faultline theory. Our computational experiments show that the stronger the demographic fault-
line in a group the more likely will the group split up into subgroups (ceteris paribus). In this event, members
of diﬀerent subgroups hold opposing opinions, diﬀer in their demographic attributes and do not like each
other.
This paper focused on Lau and Murnighan’s hypothesis that demographic faultlines aﬀect the chance that
work teams reach consensus on work related opinions. However we neglected their proposition that demo-
graphic diversity has no direct eﬀects on opinion dynamics. In all experiments reported here we kept diversity
maximal (50/50 distributions of all demographic attributes) and only varied the strength of the faultline. It
turned out that if there was no faultline or the faultline was very weak then most teams reached consensus
although diversity was maximal. This indicates that also Lau and Murnighan’s proposition about the eﬀects
of demographic diversity is in line with our model. However future research should also study our model’s
predictions if the demographic diversity is varied.
Future research should furthermore focus on the mechanisms that produce opinion polarization. As we
argued above it is not possible to explain opinion polarization by using the homophily and social inﬂuence
mechanisms alone. Further assumptions, like Axelrod’s assumption of cultural speciﬁcation, have to be
included into the model. In Lau and Murnighan’s reasoning opinion polarization becomes possible because
an initial correlation between the demographic variables and the opinions is assumed. The mechanism that
Lau and Murnighan seem to assume is that due to homophily, demographically similar actors tend to interact.
If demographic attributes and opinions correlate then interacting agents tend to agree in opinions. Once they
exchange diﬀerent arguments for the same opinions, their opinions become even more extreme. As a conse-
quence, the diﬀerence between the opinions of the demographic subgroups increases and perfect polarization
becomes possible. Without the assumption of the initial correlation between demographic attributes and opin-
ions, there is no reason to assume initial agreement of interaction partners. But then the theory does not also
imply that the exchange of arguments will render interaction partners more extreme in their opinions. Instead,
the prediction would be that actors tend to adopt more moderate opinions. Thus, with Lau and Murnighan’s
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without the assumption that demographic attributes already split the group to some extent in the ﬁrst place.
In our model, on the other hand, the two negative mechanisms of heterophobia and rejection are suﬃcient
to generate an eﬀect of faultline strength on opinion polarization. Why did we decide not to use the Lau and
Murnighan way of explaining polarization? The main argument is that the assumption of correlating demo-
graphic attributes and opinions should not be used to explain the eﬀects of faultline strength on opinion polar-
ization because then one includes the explanandum already in the explanans. What we try to explain is that the
strength of the demographic faultline leads to opinion polarization along this faultline. If we already assume in
the model that demographic attributes are correlated with the opinions then it is not surprising that the model
predicts exactly this as an outcome. Hence, we argue that the assumption of an initial positive correlation
between demographic attributes and opinions should be avoided in this context. However, our argument is
purely theoretical. We do not claim that the dynamics that Lau and Murnighan describe do not occur in real
work teams. This remains an empirical question.
The main advantage of a formal model is that it facilitates the deduction of new hypotheses. We believe that
in future research our model can be used to generate new theoretical propositions about the conditions under
which faultline eﬀects may occur. One example is the possible proposition that not only faultlines in the dis-
tribution of demographic attributes, but also faultlines in the distribution of initial opinions, or a combination
of both may aﬀect the chances that a group split emerges. Our model suggests that an initial tendency of the
group to fall apart into a small number of opposed subgroup in terms of opinions may set oﬀ a self-reinforcing
dynamic in which eventually group polarization prevails even when there may not be a strong demographic
faultline. Another interesting possible implication is that the eﬀects of faultline strength depend on the timing
of contacts, that is on who is when brought in contact with whom.
The key reason why we expect the timing of contacts to be important is the inherent path dependence of
the dynamics of social interactions between team members. For example, early contacts between group
members who are strongly dissimilar both in terms of their opinions and their demographic characteristics
may trigger negative and hostile interactions between the interactants. This, in turn, may lead them to
adopt extreme positions on some issues. If these ‘‘radicalized” actors interact subsequently with demograph-
ically similar ‘‘friends”, this may entail ‘‘bandwagon dynamics” in which the friends of the early conﬂict
partners are socially inﬂuenced to adopt similarly extreme positions. The stronger the demographic fault-
lines, the more such a dynamic would project the demographic faultline onto an emergent faultline in
the opinion space, with the result that communication between team members and thus group cohesion
and team performance may severely suﬀer. Clearly, this downward spiral might be avoided when contacts
between team members are arranged in such a way that opposed ‘‘extremists” are initially isolated from
each other and are instead exposed to interactions with demographically similar in-group members who
are more moderate in their opinions. Then, the likely consequence is that initial extremists also become
more moderate and initial moderates from diﬀerent demographic subgroups move towards each other in
the opinion space.
In a nutshell this leads to the somewhat counterintuitive prediction that cohesion in teams with a strong
faultline can be increased if the team is ﬁrst separated into two demographically homogeneous subgroups
and only later merged. We suggest that future research should focus on the timing of contacts because this
may give managers a handle to temper the negative eﬀects of demographic faultlines on team cohesion and
performance. We believe that the model we have proposed in this paper is a useful theoretical tool to explore
this possibility.Acknowledgements
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